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It is in a way easier to imagine evil actions than we often suppose, but what it is thus relatively
easy to do is not what we want to understand about evil. To argue for this conclusion I distin-
guish between imagining why someone did something and imagining how they could have done
it, and I try to grasp partial understanding, in part by distinguishing different imaginative pers-
pectives we can have on an act. When we do this we see an often unnoticed asymmetry: we do
not put the same demands on our understanding of wrongdoing as on that of most everyday,
morally acceptable, actions.
RÉSUMÉ
Il est relativement facile d’imaginer des actes maléfiques, plus facile que ce que nous sommes
prêts à supposer. Mais ce qui est ainsi facile à imaginer n’est pas ce que nous souhaitons com-
prendre à propos des actes maléfiques. Pour étayer cette conclusion, je distingue entre compren-
dre pourquoi quelqu'un fait ce qu'il fait et imaginer comment cette personne aurait fait une telle
chose; j'essaie aussi de saisir ce qu'est la compréhension partielle, du moins en partie, en distin-
guant entre elles les différentes perspectives imaginaires d’un même acte. C’est ainsi qu’apparaît
une asymétrie qui passe souvent inaperçue: nous n'imposons pas les mêmes exigences à l'égard
de notre compréhension d’actes répréhensibles qu'à l’égard d’actions quotidiennes moralement
acceptables.
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“No man and no woman is an island, but every one of us is
a peninsula …. Every social and political system that turns
each of us into a Donnean island and the rest of humanity
into an enemy or a rival is a monster. …. The condition of
peninsula is the proper human condition.”
Amos Oz How to cure a fanatic
This is a collection of observations about how we can understand
awful actions, acts that are not merely wrong but which appal us by
their disregard for normal constraints. These are acts that fit the nor-
mal use of the English word “evil”. (The best French equivalent, I
believe, is “malefique”. The sense of awfulness is much stronger than
for “mal”. It is similarly stronger than most uses of “uebel” in German.
See chapter one of Morton 2004.) It can seem hard to understand
how someone could consider such an act, let alone how someone
could intend it, let alone how someone could actually perform it. So
our capacities for intuitive grasp of another person’s motives are chal-
lenged by this basic and not at all rare dimension to human life. (In
this connection see McGinn 1997.)
My concern is with our capacities for intuitive understanding of
our own and other people’s actions, and not with the development of
a scientific explanation of atrocity. I doubt that there is a single scien-
tific explanation of atrocity. Evil, atrocity, wrong-doing in general are
not scientific concepts. Each particular action may be explainable in
terms of neurology or scientifically based psychology, but the expla-
nations are unlikely to fit together into a satisfying pattern. Even the
limited ambition of intuitive imagination of atrocity is well beyond
the ambition of this paper. I shall present a series of linked observa-
tions that are meant to prepare the ground for an account of what is
possible and impossible in the imaginative understanding of evil, and
how we can sharpen or deepen our capacities for it. A prolegomena.
One of my conclusions is at tension with the apparent direction of
the introductory paragraph above. I shall argue that in some ways
evil actions are easier to imagine than we often suppose.
THE ILLUSION OF CHARACTER
We do not want to be like those who do acts we abhor. Sometimes
they are our enemies, and we ignore the abhorrent acts that we have
performed towards them. Then we find it convenient to divide the
world into Us and Them, with an accumulation of good characteris-
tics in our direction. This tendency can occur in very subtle forms,
as a result of the bias noted by social psychologists of the 1970s: we
underestimate the variability of individual people’s behaviour, taking
the variation in human action to be due to the tendency of some peo-
ple consistently to perform acts of one kind and of some others consis-
tently to perform acts of another. So we assess the variability of acts
over the whole population correctly, but underestimate how much of
this variability is shared by each member of it. As a result, once we
admit that an individual has more than a slight tendency to some kind
of behaviour, we are inclined to classify her as one of those who do
that kind of thing: there is no middle ground. And in particular if we
admit any tendency in ourselves to evil actions we are in danger of
assimilating ourselves to the evil-doers we imagine to be a certain
proportion of the world. (Nisbett and Ross 1991, Doris 2002.)
Evil-doers can imagine evil actions, notably in planning them. So
the ability to imagine evil is one step towards the ability to do it. So
we resist the suggestion that we can even imagine the motivation of
the acts that we abhor. And in so doing we encourage and solidify the
demonic attitude to evil, the attitude that most awful deeds are the acts
of a small number of awful people, very different from the rest of us.
In so characterising it I do not want to assert that the attitude is false
of all sub-categories of evil. There probably are kinds of horror that
are the speciality of special kinds of people. (The obvious example is
people who are obsessed with sadistic sex, requiring unwilling victims.)
But very many awful actions have no such psychological story. The
immediate point is the psychological pressure to accept such an atti-
tude in advance of any serious evidence for it.
The resistance to believing that we can imagine the motivation
behind atrocious acts has another source. We fear that by imagining
such acts we might make it easier to imagine them. And if we find
it easier to imagine them we might find it easier to intend them. Is
this fear justified?
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IMAGINING HOW VERSUS IMAGINING WHY
Many awful actions are performed for perfectly straightforward
motives, which we can easily grasp. To that extent we have no dif-
ficulty understanding why the acts were performed. Someone tortures
an old woman to make her reveal where her money is hidden: why?
To get the money, of course. What is more difficult is to imagine
how he could have done it. That is, we find it hard to imagine how
this way of getting money would occur to him as a serious possibi-
lity, and how he could overcome all the reasons to prefer other sources
of money or simply to remain poor. To say that these are harder to
imagine is not to say we cannot do it ; at the very least we need more
detail of the case. (There is a connection here with the now classic
themes of Arendt 1963, 1971.)
The how/why distinction does not apply only to evil actions. It
applies to all actions. It is also quite vivid with regard to disgusting
but morally acceptable actions. Someone is locked in a room for 4
days, and his only way of surviving is to drink his own urine and to
eat dog shit. We have no problem knowing why he did this: he did
not want to die and he was overwhelmingly hungry and thirsty. We
may find ourselves balking when we try to imagine how he did it.
How could he bring himself to it? The obstacle is a lack of imagi-
nation, or better a barrier to imagination. After only one day in the
locked room most of us could easily imagine it. And it is easy to
ridicule squeamish people whose aversion to such an act makes them
reluctant even to imagine it. But it is true of most of us that our ima-
gination of the motivational process would lack a certain vividness.
This will matter for some purposes, but is irrelevant for others.
(It is curious that the disgusting act here is rational. In fact it could
be irrational not to perform it. Many people will not have difficulty
imagining performing an irrational alternative to drinking the urine,
such as waiting and suffering extreme thirst. So we have an irratio-
nal act, for which “how could someone do it?” is easier to answer
imaginatively than for an alternative rational act. Of course, the ima-
gination here is misleading, in that when put in such a situation a
person is unlikely to hold out for as long as they imagine. It would
be interesting to describe situations in which it is hard to imagine
how someone could have made herself perform a morally good action,
while some somewhat immoral alternative is easy to imagine.)
The how/why distinction is not restricted to imaginative unders-
tanding of actions. Consider a pebble hitting a window, and the win-
dow breaking. It is not hard to understand why the window broke: it
broke because of the impact of the pebble. It is harder to understand
how the impact of a small pebble could have caused a solid window
to shatter. We may have to postulate some crack in the glass, or a
way in which the pebble is hurled at extraordinary velocity.
Here is a hypothesis about everyday psychological understanding.
When we are asked to explain why someone did something we appeal
first of all to a socially-shaped theory of standard motives and stan-
dard reactions to situations. The usual problems and their usual solu-
tions. This gets us through most of our everyday needs to explain
and predict one another’s actions and to make sense of ourselves to
others. When, on the other hand, we have to explain how someone
did (could do) something, we appeal first of all to our capacities to
imagine the motivation involved. We require a projection into the situa-
tion of the other person and into the exact play of their motives and
emotions. This is harder, and we do it less. (We do it more at a pre-
articulate level, for example in anticipating the movements of someone
coming towards us on the sidewalk or the decisions of another driver,
than, in ordinary circumstances, we do in response to a verbal request
for an explanation.)
One result of the division of labour between theory and imagina-
tion, and the relative rarity of articulate expressions of imagination, is
that we think that evil actions are inherently hard to understand. Or,
rather, that they are inherently even harder to understand than they are.
For our more practiced and mechanical means of understanding give
us a grasp of why things are done, and our more delicate and virtuo-
sic means of understanding give us our grasp of how the agents could
perform them. With everyday actions we usually ask for why, and with
exceptional acts we more often ask for how, so that we generate a pres-
sure to exaggerate the inexplicability of the latter.
GRADES OF IMAGINATION
Focus now on imagination. We speak of imagining what lies behind
an action (and to some extent, mutatis mutandis, of imagining other
causal processes) in several different ways, involving different degrees
of involvement of our image-making and story-telling capacities. At
the most basic level imagination is a rather vivid form of thinking.
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We express this with embedded-sentence constructions “if you come
to town I imagine that you will stay at the hotel Bristol.” “Can you
imagine why he refused to buy the stock at a discount? Yes, he expec-
ted the market to crash and thought that even at a discount it was
worth less than the cash.” The main difference between imagining a
motive and simply believing or hypothesising it, is that in imagining
it one links it to one’s own capacities to think and to plan. One does
what Jane Heal (1995) calls “cocognition”, predicting that another
person will solve an intellectual or practical problem in the way that
one would.
A deeper level of imagination, further removed from theorizing
about motives, involves a perspectival element. One’s representation
of the other person’s situation embodies a point of view similar to
theirs. This can be a matter of seeing spatial relations the way they
do. If you are imagining someone’s efforts to get to the other side of
a crowded room you image the obstacles as they will see them, igno-
ring the short-cut that would be clear if one was looking down on
the scene from above, even if one is aware of it. In such cases one
organizes the information that one is in imagination relating the per-
son to, in a way that is intended to match her organization of it. One
way, a typical and central human way, of organizing information is
to prepare a framework into which present and anticipated informa-
tion can be fitted, and from which it can be quickly retrieved and
related to other relevant information. A simple example is seeing
space in terms of directions and distances to ones own location, even
as one moves, providing a quick guide to bodily actions, reactions to
things coming towards one, and paths of approach and escape. The
result is like a coordinate system in geometry, with oneself at the ori-
gin. Another example is understanding past and future in terms of
stages in the lives of a few particular people, oneself in particular.
These two data-organizing templates, spatial perspective and narra-
tive structure, are often combined, to give the typical human perspec-
tive on the world: a fabric of interweaving person-strands, each strand
at each moment being the origin of a self-centred coordinate system.
When a person plans an action in terms of an information-orga-
nizing framework with an origin and coordinates she is in effect cen-
tering her imagining of her performance on this origin. Now suppose
that the action is a reaction to some aspect of the environment and
that someone else is imagining it by pretending to react to the same
situation, that is, arriving at a sequence of actions governed by an
information-organizing framework attributed in imagination to the first
person. That framework centres the second person’s imagination of
the first person, to use Peter Goldie’s terminology, in terms of the
first person’s perspective. (See Goldie 2000 for perspective in imagi-
nation. For narrative structure in fiction and its connection with ima-
ginative perspective see part II of Currie 1995.) Most of our imagi-
nation of people is centred, though the perspective can vary depen-
ding on the states being imagined and the imagining person take on
the imagined.
A third grade of imagination adds to perspective a reproduction
of something like the feelings and emotions of the other person.
Sometimes this will result naturally from the effort of perspectival
imagination. (And sometimes it will happen independently of it. There
can be affect-loaded non-centred imagination, impersonal empathy,
though there is something rather un-natural about it.) Suppose for
example that you are comforting a friend who is recently bereaved
and extremely upset. His feelings, as you imagine them, are for you
just a definite fact about the situation. You are doing a lot more than
simply describing his feelings to yourself. Your belief that he is in
despair is richer than an application of the predicate “is in despair”
to him, since you also have a sense of what kind of despair he is in,
what it is like for him, a sense that you can only partially express in
words. You think “he feels like this” where the demonstrative points
to the emotions you imagine him to have. So at this more delicate
and dangerous moment, where imagination is more distinct from sim-
ple ascription, one has to entertain an emotion while at the same time
realizing that it is a representation of another person’s emotion and
not something that one is feeling oneself. This can be quite deman-
ding. (See chapter 1 of McGinn 2004 and chapter 1 of Currie and
Ravenscroft 2002 for the differences between imagination and belief.
See Tappolet 2000 and Deonna 2007 for the immediacy of other’s
emotions. And see Harris 2000 on imagination in children and human
life generally.)
There is in fact a fourth level of psychological imagination, though
I will not say much about it. Besides taking the perspective of the
person one is imagining, and feeling some representation of what they
feel, one can identify with them. One can take their pain as a bad
thing, and the achievement of their aims as desirable. This does not
follow from the other levels. Someone trapping or manipulating ano-
ther person, for example, may do so by imagining very vividly what
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the other is thinking and feeling, but may do so in a way that takes
the other person’s ends as alien to their own. This is an important
distinction in ethics, but less so for our purposes now. It does bring
out a verbal difficulty, though. We might call perspective plus affect
“empathy” and empathy plus identification “sympathy”. And people
often make a contrast between empathy and sympathy. But it is not
always clear that this is the contrast they are making. Sometimes peo-
ple seem to use “empathy” for what I am now calling “sympathy”,
and vice versa.
PARTIAL IMAGINATION
I have been talking about “imagining the motivation behind an
act”. The motivation? All of it? Relevant to almost every act of almost
every person is an immense body of desires, with unique complex
internal conflicts, inhibitions, capacities and incapacities, beliefs,
confidence, arbitrary assumptions, half-thoughts, … . No one could
imagine all of these. No one could represent to another all of their
own motivation for all but the most trivial of actions. (Don’t be foo-
led by the Aristotelian practical syllogism, according to which
someone sees the end, sees the means, and if they are rational chooses
the mean. It’s not like that. In this connection see Richardson 1994.)
So one almost never understands all that lies behind an action.
One has partial understanding, and usually what one understands is
enough for a contrastive explanation, that is, an explanation of why
the person did A rather than B or C. The contrasts are typically dif-
ferent in ordinary cooperative or at any rate non-extraordinary acts,
and in remarkably clever, remarkably stupid, or remarkably wicked
acts. With the former one explains, for example, why the driver picked
up the hitch-hiker rather than driving on. With the latter one explains
why she picked him up rather than running him over or doing a U-
turn on the spot or driving into the woods. The alternative actions in
the former case are other standard solutions to the same problem
(“how to be helpful without exposing oneself to a lot of risk or incon-
venience”) while the alternatives in the latter case are solutions to
other problems that a person might take herself to be confronting
(“how to prevent the hitchiker from identifying me”, “how to kill
someone in a way that will not be traced to me”.) So it is not sur-
prising that the former are relatively easy to achieve and the latter
are relatively difficult: we are not comparing like with like.
Another way of putting the point. There are apriori an enormous
number of options a person has in a given situation. In everyday
explanation one presupposes a winnowing procedure which has eli-
minated 95 percent of them. In fact the usual explanatory principles
will only engage once one has eliminated the 95 percent. But in order
to explain an extraordinary act one has to understand the winnowing
too, and this requires a deeper imaginative grasp. Or, to be precise,
we demand that the winnowing be explained, that one make intelli-
gible why the person thought of the problem in a way that made tor-
turing the old woman a solution, rather than simply saying “to get
the money”.
REGULAR AND UNUSUAL
If what I have been saying is right, it is easier to imagine than we
often suppose. The “why” is often obvious, and an imaginative grasp
of the perspective from which one means to an evil end was prefe-
rable to another is often not hard to get. These answers may seem to
trivialise the original question. We wanted to know the source of the
barriers to imagining awful actions. A short esssay like this is cer-
tainly not going to reveal their deeper sources. But instead we seem
to be learning that the barriers are less steep than we thought, so that
the question itself is misleading. This is partly true. Let me expand
on it in two ways.
asymmetrical curiosity Our grasp of many actions is fairly shal-
low, without our remarking on it. Why does your neighbour put on
his bicycle helmet before his sunglasses, so the two get tangled up.
Why does your boss prefer to gossip in her office and talk business
in the coffee shop? These things are morally neutral, and not very
important, so you do not linger on the fact that your grasp of what
it is about the people that makes them act these ways is superficial
and tentative. If the acts were shocking or disastrous you might be
more bothered by your limited comprehension.
One reason for the asymmetry is that the neighbour and the boss
are not doing anything very interesting or surprising or important, so
we do not think much about them. This cannot be the whole expla-
nation, though. If a horrible person acts in their usual predictable hor-
rible way on a perfectly trivial matter that still reveals their nasty ten-
dencies, we may not shrug it off but linger in puzzlement. Why on
earth would anyone do that?
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Another reason is the integration between imagination and action-
planning in one’s own case. Consider a person performing a compli-
cated intentional action which takes some time to perform. She first
plans it in general outline, and then when carrying it out thinks out
the details in increasing detail as the times for putting them into
action approach. Some of this thinking is very intuitive, depending
heavily on spatial imagery and kinesthetic rehearsal. The details vary
from person to person and action to action, but the general effect is
that one imagines oneself performing parts of the action somewhat
in advance of the actual performance, with a perspective that will aid
the performance. Many details of the production of the action, and
of the motivation that led to it, are omitted from this imagination.
But one ignores these ; their absence does not make a problem. Then
when one considers a possible action as performed by oneself, or a
similar action performed by someone else, one runs through the kind
of exercise that would be involved in the imagination that prepares
for and partially manages such an action. One then says “yes, I can
imagine doing that”, skipping over all the details one has not imagi-
ned. This will happen for actions of kinds that are in one’s regular
repertoire. For unfamiliar actions one will attempt a more fundamen-
tal imagination, and often one will report failure.
MOODS, EXISTENTIAL FEELINGS
We easily think of evil actions as performed by evil people: sadists,
psychopaths, fanatics. The evidence is that people of determinate
pathological kinds are responsible for a small proportion of the hor-
rors of the world. Still, when wanting to imagine what it takes to
harm a child deliberately or to throw a cat through a window, we try
to imagine not so much the motives one might have as the frame of
mind one might be in. Roughly, the kind of temporary person one
might be.
I have been neglecting this topic in this essay, and I will not do
justice to it now. It is the subject of an interesting recent book by
Matthew Ratcliffe (Ratcliffe 2008). We wonder “what it is like to be”
someone who is in an interesting situation or an unusual state or who
has done some noteworthy action. This is one of the foci of our infor-
mal curiosity, and we are disappointed in informal or psychological
accounts that do not address it. But it is not clear what we really
want, and what can be had. There may be no stable facts about what
it is like to be a particular person, or the only facts may be disappoin-
tingly banal (“well, it’s to be human”). The vocabulary we have on eve-
ryday life, and the things that many philosophers suggest, may feed on
illusions about mood, character, and consciousness. There is an impor-
tant opening here for critical and imaginative philosophy. Still, the
conviction persists, that if we could connect our own experience of
being enraged, paranoid, jealous, or vindictive with the motives that lie
behind atrocity, we would understand better what we have in common
with and what differentiates us from the perpetrators.
There is an obvious warning to give. Almost everyone is some-
times enraged, paranoid, jealous, or vindictive. So almost everyone
has some knowledge of what is is like to be in these states. But most
people do not do unusually awful things, remarkably, given how com-
mon rage, despair, and contempt are. So knowing what it is like to
be in these states may tell one little about what it is like - may give
one few resources for imagining - not to have or to be able to over-
come the barriers that prevent most of us from giving in to impulses
to act in awful ways.
And there is a slightly less obvious response to the warning. Most
of us have never done anything really atrocious, but most of us are
in various degrees complicit in various atrocities. We know that our
actions help these atrocities to proceed but we do not think how to
change our ways. So reflection on our moral numbness and akrasia
might give us some insight into the ways that objections to atrocity
are sometimes ignored. Moreover, when we free ourselves from the
idea that people have fixed characters which govern their behaviour
more than their responses to the situations they find themselves in,
we realise that what we have to acquire in order to project imagina-
tively from the rage, dislike, and numbness that is familiar in our
lives, to real evil, is not an additional mood but more insight into the
ways in which we can be pushed by what is happening around us.
HOW MUCH WE DO NOT KNOW
We should keep three things separate in our thinking. There are
moral categories, the kinds of acts and motives that we ought to favour
or avoid. There are psychological categories, the underlying processes
and causes that as a matter of mental fact produce our acts. And,
third, there are imaginative categories, kinds of acts and states of
mind that we can simulate in the same ways. We should not confound
these. There are morally similar acts that are psychologically very
distinct. And there are psychologically similar acts that are imagina-
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tively very different: the ways of imagining one kind may not suc-
ceed with the other. For all that, the study of our imagination of act,
motive, and character must bring all three together. We need to dis-
cover what ways of imagining a given state are actually, as a matter
of psychological fact, effective in giving an accurate impression of
what it is like to be a particular person in a particular environment
doing a particular thing. But any discoveries we make here will be
much more significant if they concern kinds of actions that we have
good reasons to care about, and this includes acts in morally impor-
tant categories. So we have to fit all three aspects together, carefully.
To end this essay I will state a conjecture. Our tendency to run
together the moral and the psychological disposes us to model evil
actions on morally similar, though less drastic, ones. So we try to
imagine sadism along the lines of petty cruelty. My conjecture is that
this is a mistake, in that we can imagine more accurately by compa-
ring evil acts to acts which are morally neutral or even admirable,
but which are psychologically and imaginatively more similar (in
morally relevant ways, even though the moral character of the acts is
different.) For example, I have argued elsewhere (Morton 2009) that
acts of childish naughtiness are in some ways good comparators for
some acts of moral heroism. In another publication (Morton 2004) I
have argued that naughtiness can be a comparator for some kinds of
evil (as is suggested by one ambiguity of the French méchant: naughty
or noxious). These are surprising claims and deserve a long argu-
ment, but in a nutshell the idea is that we should consider cases in
which there is an emotional route to circumvent a natural human bar-
rier to a natural human motive. After all, as remarked above we do
not want to make a comparison that leaves us with no intuitive hold
on something essential to the act, namely that it requires the suspen-
sion of a normal obstacle.
There is much that we do not know here. We do not have a clear
grasp of the concept of accurate versus inaccurate imagining. But
without it the project of imaginatively grasping the motives of peo-
ple who do evil acts is trivial. We do not know how deep into the
psychology of action accurate imagination can penetrate. And we do
not know what chains of intermediary steps can best exercise our
capacities to imagine what we now cannot. There is a lot to be done.
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